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INTRODUCTION: THE BROKEN PROOF STRUCTURES OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

A.

THE WRECK

HE employment discrimination law1 of the United States is broken. The proof structures or analytical frameworks 2 that define
how discrimination cases are litigated and how they are analyzed
at all dispositive stages of litigation are in a state of extreme disrepair.
Consequently, employment discrimination law is "running" poorly, and it
is up to Congress to fix it. Congress must pass legislation to clarify the
proof structures. Such a fix is badly needed to restore an acceptable level
of clarity, predictability, and functionality in employment discrimination
litigation.
There are two proof structures under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination: 3 1) McDonnell Douglas or pretext; and 2) mixed motives.
Among several problems with these proof structures, the most significant
is that no one knows which one applies in any given case. Furthermore, it
is a mystery whether uniform disparate treatment proof structures are
applicable to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). While there is uncertainty regarding uniformity for disparate
treatment, it is clear that there is one disparate impact 4 proof structure
for Title VII and one for the ADEA, and each has multiple problems and
uncertainties.
The proof structures are the engines of employment discrimination law,
and their current condition means that the wreck that is employment discrimination law needs an overhaul. Given statutes that simply say it is
unlawful "to discriminate" in employment terms "because of" sex, race,
1. When using the term "employment discrimination law," I am referring primarily to
the following statutes and the case law developed under those laws: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253-66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2000)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-202 § 2, 81 Stat. 602-08 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§621-633a
(2000)); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000)). Of course race discrimination
claims also can be asserted under section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). There are other
employment discrimination laws in the U.S., such as the newly enacted Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, but most of the principles and structures of employment discrimination law have been developed under these three acts.
2. "Proof structure" refers to what must be proven, in what order, and on whom the
burden rests at each stage. The Supreme Court, in the decision in which it announced the
McDonnell Douglas or pretext proof structure, described the thing it was creating: "The
case before us raises significant questions as to the proper order and nature of proof in
actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1973).
3. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
4. Disparate impact is a theory of unintentional discrimination in which liability is
based on the use of a facially neutral practice or criterion that produces a statistically significant impact on a protected group, and the practice cannot be justified. Id. Disparate
impact has been described as being based on either strict liability or negligence. See David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 931-36 (1993).
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etc., 5 the courts have used the proof structures to develop the procedural,
evidentiary, and substantive law of employment discrimination law. Over
the course of the forty-three years or so that employment discrimination
law has existed, 6 the Supreme Court has created the proof structures, and
both the Supreme Court and Congress have clarified and modified them.
Congress has stepped in and modified or clarified the proof structures
legislatively when it deemed the Court to be moving in the wrong direction in developing the proof structures, as it did in the Civil Rights Act of
1991. 7 At this stage, Congress needs to take its turn again. It may soon
have an opportunity. Although the omnibus Civil Rights Act of 2008,
which was introduced in Congress, would amend the employment discrimination laws in many important ways,8 the bill as introduced would
not repair the proof structures. There is no more important task for Congress in fixing employment discrimination law than repairing the proof
structures.
Consider the following hypothetical discussion between a federal district judge and his law clerk. The employment discrimination case described is far from unusual, and the motion for summary judgment filed
by the defendant is an everyday matter for courts adjudicating employment discrimination cases. If the law is close to as confused as I posit in
this hypothetical (and it is), 9 then the law is in urgent need of repair.
B.

RULING ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

A

HYPOTHETICAL SURVEY OF THE WRECK

"How do I rule on this motion, Clerk?" Judge Federal District bellows
at his clerk.
"It's very complicated, Judge. I am not sure how you should rule,"
responds the clerk sheepishly.
Judge District is preparing to rule on the defendant's motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case in which John Q.
Employee, a fifty-year-old white male, was not hired after applying to
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act).
6. Title VII is the oldest of our employment discrimination laws if we exclude the
earlier Equal Pay Act, which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act. Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat.
241, 266 (1964) (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of
enactment).
7. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The 1991 Act was enacted after President Bush's veto of the similar Civil Rights Act of 1990. 136 CONo. REC. S16,418-19 (daily
ed. Oct. 22, 1990). A principal objective of the 1991 Act was to overturn several Supreme
Court decisions. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 694-96.
8. See H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 2554, 110th Cong. (2008). See Democrats

Introduce Wide-Ranging Bill to Bolster Employment Rights and Remedies, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 17, at A-3 (Jan. 28, 2008).
9. A federal court of appeals judge explained the problems and confusion in the current state of disparate treatment law. See generally Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem
with Pretext, 85 DENv. U. L. REV. 503 (2008).
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and being interviewed by defendant Employer. Employer hired an older
African American woman. He filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination based on race,
sex, and age. In the job classification for which the plaintiff applied and
in its workforce as a whole, the employer has a much higher percentage
of Caucasians and men than African-Americans and women. After receiving his right to sue letter, Employee filed suit in federal district court
alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination.
After discovery, defendant Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of the plaintiff's employment discrimination
claims. As is the custom of Judge District, he and his clerk read all the
briefs, and they discuss the case.
"Well, Clerk, the briefs are clear and the law seems well defined. What
do you see as the problem?"
"Judge, I think employment discrimination law is broken. Until the
Supreme Court or Congress fixes it, I don't know how you should rule on
this motion."
"That's preposterous, Clerk. Your days on law review have made you
too contemplative. Employment discrimination law has been around for
over forty years, and I have seen it develop. It has been a very orderly
process in which the Supreme Court has explained the law in several
landmark cases. Surely you are not suggesting that Congress and the Supreme Court would leave the law so confused that judges could not rule
on motions for summary judgment."
"I don't think it is that simple, your Honor. With all due respect, I
think that is precisely the state of confusion in which Congress and the
Court have left us."
"Come now, we shall enjoy a nice discussion about employment discrimination law and determine how to rule on this motion. I shall explain
employment discrimination law to you, and then you may write letters of
apology to the Supreme Court and Congress. Let us begin with the
claims for race, sex, and age discrimination under the disparate treatment
theory. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination, which the Supreme Court once labeled as 'the most easily understood type of discrimination.'1 ° So, even you, Clerk, should be able to understand disparate
treatment, although as the Court suggested, you may find disparate impact more difficult. 1 Because the plaintiff asserts both the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories, let's resolve the easier one first.
As everyone knows, disparate treatment cases are analyzed, for purposes
of summary judgment, under the famous McDonnell Douglas12 or pretext
analysis. It is a three-step analysis. First, the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, which essentially requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she
is in a protected class, that there is a job available, and that the plaintiff is
10. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
11. See id.
12. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
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basically qualified to perform the job, although the elements vary somewhat depending on what type of adverse employment action the employer took.1 3 At stage two, the employer has the burden of production
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision. 14 As everyone knows, stages one and two are easy to satisfy,
and virtually no cases are resolved at those stages. 15 So, this motion for
summary judgment is likely to be resolved at stage three-the pretext
stage. Now, Clerk, I'll grant you that the pretext stage is somewhat complex, and the Supreme Court has found it necessary to clarify its meaning
in a couple of cases, but the Court did so. 16 At stage three the task is to
determine, on a motion for summary judgment, whether there is sufficient evidence that the defendant's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.' 7 That is, if we do not believe
the reason given by the employer for taking the adverse employment action, then we may infer that the real reason is discriminatory, although we
are not required to so infer. 18 Now, I know that is a bit complicated, but
the Court has been clear about this, and surely we can decide the disparate treatment claim under the analysis I have explained, Clerk."
"Judge, I am loathe to disagree with you, but I think there are a number of problems that make it much more complicated and less certain
than you explained. First, it is not clear that the McDonnell Douglas
analysis applies to plaintiff Employee's disparate treatment claims."
"Heresy!" exclaimed the indignant Judge District.
"No, Judge. As I am sure you know, the Supreme Court announced an
alternative proof structure or analysis for disparate treatment claims in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.19 That case set forth the mixed-motives
analysis, under which there are two stages. 20 First, the plaintiff must
prove that the protected characteristic was a motivating or substantial
factor (the case produced no majority opinion on the standard of causation), and then the defendant could still win the case and avoid liability
by proving the same-decision defense-that it would have taken the same
adverse action for nondiscriminatory reasons. 21 Congress stepped in to
13. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 & n.6 (1976).
14. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
15. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); George
Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1992) ("The fact
that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas usually is of no
consequence because the plaintiff's burden of making out that case, and the defendant's
rebuttal burden of showing a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory' reason, are so easily satisfied.
Almost all individual cases under McDonnell Douglas come down to a determination
whether the plaintiff has proved that the 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' offered by
the defendant is really a pretext for discrimination.").
16. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993).
17. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
18. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47.
19. 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
20. See id.
21. Id.
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modify and clarify the Price Waterhouse proof structure in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.22 First, Congress selected "motivating factor" as the
standard of causation. 23 Second, Congress changed the same-decision defense so that it does not operate as a complete affirmative defense, precluding liability, but instead limits the remedies that are available if the
defendant "demonstrates" (satisfies the burden of persuasion) that it
would have made the same employment decision absent the discrimina'24
tory reason.
"Yes, of course, Clerk. I know about Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Act," interjected Judge District. "But many more disparate treatment
cases are analyzed under McDonnell Douglas or pretext because, as you
should have learned in law school, the Price Waterhouse or mixed-motives analysis applies to only cases in which there is direct evidence of
discrimination. There are far more cases involving circumstantial evidence of discrimination than those involving direct evidence."
"Judge, that was once the state of the law, but do you remember the
Supreme Court's decision in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa?25
"Yes, I read it, but it does not say very much, and it did not change
anything I just explained to you."
"Well, your Honor, I certainly agree that the opinion says little. Indeed, the Court in a footnote declined to clarify the big picture of disparate treatment law.2 6 But some think that the Court's eradication of the
criterion used to classify cases as pretext or mixed-motives necessarily
changed the way disparate treatment cases are analyzed."
"Yes, I have heard that some academics have read the case as abrogating McDonnell Douglas,2 7 but the Court did not say that. It is very presumptuous of those ivory tower law professors to suggest that the Court
sub silento overruled a well-established analysis that it had carefully developed over a period of more than thirty years."
22. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075-76 (1991) (codified at scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). See supra note 7.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
25. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
26. See id. at 94 n.1 ("This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107
applies outside of the mixed-motive context."). The footnote should not be read as a rejection of the argument that mixed-motives has swallowed up the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis. Instead, it simply expressly limits the decision of the Court to the question the
Court answered-a not uncommon device. See Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of SecondOrder Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the
Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 540-541 (2008).
27. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among
Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 (2004); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1549, 1550-52
(2005); William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace? 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 200 (2003); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive le
Roid": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of
Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72 (2003).
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"Your Honor, the problem for us is that the Court clearly did say in
Desert Palace that there is no requirement in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
that a plaintiff produce direct evidence in order to be entitled to a "motivating factor" jury instruction. 28 With the dividing line erased between
cases that are to be analyzed under the pretext analysis and those to be
analyzed under mixed-motives, how do we know which one to use?"
"That is an interesting point, Clerk. How have the courts of appeals
resolved that issue?"
"In short, not well, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in
cases raising the issue. 29 Some courts have said that Desert Palacedid not
change anything. Others, unsure about how to decide which analysis to
apply, have applied both. 30 One court held that McDonnell Douglas concases while a motivating factor analysis
tinues to apply to single-motive 31
applies to mixed-motives cases."
"But, Clerk, how can we preserve distinctions between the analyses of
single- and mixed-motives cases if Desert Palace erased the dividing line?
How does a court know which type it is dealing with?"
"Judge, the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. seemed to
rely on the complaint and how the plaintiff pled his claims. 32 The court
to one section of Title
said that the plaintiff brought one claim pursuant
33
VII and one pursuant to another section."
"Depending on the pleading, to separate them does not seem fair or
reasonable. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 34establish a notice
pleading system in which specificity is not required."
"Indeed, your Honor. Reliance on how a claim is pled to decide which
proof structure applies seems ill-advised and contrary to the Federal
Rules and Supreme Court precedent. 35 The Court rejected a require28. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-01 (2003).
29. See, e.g., Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 930 (Jan. 12, 2009) (No. 08-618); Read v. B.T. Alex Brown, No. 02-10191,
2003 WL 21754966 (5th Cir. July 30, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.
2005) (holding that plaintiff may survive summary judgment by prevailing under either of
the two proof structures), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1091 (2006) . For an opinion summarizing
the positions of the various circuits, see White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381
(6th Cir. 2008).

31. See White, 533 F.3d at 400-01.
32. Id. at 390 & n.4. The court said the single-motive claim was brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the mixed-motives claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Id. The district court, in discussing the claim analyzed under pretext and the claim analyzed under mixed motives, referred to the type of evidence presented in support of each
(circumstantial and direct, respectively), although the court also discussed the Desert Palace abrogation of that line. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 05-71201, 2007 WL
1119881 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2007).

33. See White, 533 F.3d at 390 & n.4.
34. See, e.g., Diamond, 416 F.3d at 317 n.3 ("Whether [plaintiff] pled a mixed-motive
claim is irrelevant.., because 'a case need not be characterized or labeled at the outset....
[T]he complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the adverse employment action was taken because of a protected characteristic.'" (quoting Costa v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).

35. Id.
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ment that pleadings must be' 3strictly
tied to the proof structures in
6
Swierkiewicz v. Sorenma N.A.

"Are there any other and better resolutions of this mess, Clerk?"
"Well, Judge, the most creative and ambitious resolution is that of the
Fifth Circuit in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc. 3 7 In an age discrimination
case, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Desert Palace did effect a significant
change. 3s The court announced a 'modified McDonnell Douglas' analysis
in which the first two parts of the pretext analysis remain unchanged, and
only the third part is modified. 39 At part three, a plaintiff may prevail by
proving either pretext or motivating factor. 40 If the plaintiff proves motivating factor, then the same-decision defense is available to the
'4 1
defendant."
"That's more like it, Clerk. The Fifth Circuit has made things more
manageable with that approach. How have other courts reacted?"
"No other circuit has adopted the 'modified McDonnell Douglas' approach, 42 and even some panels within the Fifth Circuit have seemed unsure that Rachid is the framework that is generally applicable to all
disparate treatment cases. 43 Though the combined analysis does make
our job easier, I do not understand the continuing relevance of the pretext prong. If motivating factor is enough, plaintiffs opposing motions for
summary judgment always should insist on having their cases analyzed
under motivating factor rather than pretext."
"Another good point, Clerk. I like McDonnell Douglas, and I am very
comfortable analyzing summary judgments under it. It is like a comfortable old blanket. Let's say that pretext analysis continues to apply to motions for summary judgment, but does not apply thereafter. That should
work, right?"
"Judge, that is what the Ninth Circuit said in its en banc decision in
Desert Palace.44 However, could we apply one standard to analyzing a
motion for summary judgment and then apply a different standard at
trial? Isn't summary judgment supposed to determine, under the same
standard applicable to a motion for judgment as a matter of law, whether
there is any need for a jury resolution? It seems to me that we need to
apply the same analysis to summary judgment that we will later apply to
determining whether the jury gets to decide the case, and if so under what
36. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).

37. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
38. Id. at 312.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 312-13.

42. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp, 533 F.3d 381, 398-99 (2008).
43. See Greene v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. of N. Am., 128 F. App'x 353, 356 n.7 (5th

Cir. 2005) (stating that court need not consider the effect of Desert Palace and Rachid on
the case before it).
44. See Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 854 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90
(2003).
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instructions. 45
"That is a good point, Clerk. But I am going to analyze this case at the
summary judgment stage under McDonnell Douglas. The appellate
courts can take the pretext analysis from me when they pry it from my
cold, dead fingers."
"Okay, Judge. And the jury instructions will be what? Pretext-based?
What if the defendant asks for the same-decision defense jury
instruction?"
"We'll cross that bridge when we get to it. It will not be an issue if I
grant the motion for summary judgment. I want you to analyze the disparate treatment claim under McDonnell Douglas, and then for good measure, analyze it under mixed motives, too, to see if the result is any
different. Wait a minute; that will be a problem if it comes out differently. Do that combined, modified analysis the Fifth Circuit made up in
Rachid. That should cover all bases."
"Okay, Judge. How about the disparate treatment claim based on
age?"
"Same thing. Why should it be different from race and sex?"
"Some courts have said that whatever the Supreme Court did in Desert
46
Palace, it had no effect on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Thus, the mixed-motives analysis applicable to the age claim could be the
Price Waterhouse version rather than the Civil Rights Act of 1991
version.

47

"But you said the Fifth Circuit Rachid case was an age discrimination
case. The Fifth Circuit did not seem bothered by the distinction that you
'48
just made: that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA.
"Right, Judge. The Fifth Circuit dispatched with that issue expeditiously, reasoning that the ADEA and Title VII statutory prohibitions are
similar.49 But some other courts have rejected the Fifth Circuit's harmonization or unification of the analyses, finding inadequate support for it in
45. Courts are divided on whether a McDonnell Douglas or pretext jury instruction
should be given, although a majority hold that the burden-shifting scheme should not be
included in jury instructions. See, e.g., Tymkovich, supra note 9, at 527-28. My point here
is that classifying a case as single motive/pretext or mixed-motives has been understood as
requiring different jury instructions. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 (describing the two possible jury instructions); Chambers, supra note 27, at 99 ("The fact that pretext and mixedmotives cases are interchangeable but can yield different jury instructions is troubling.").
Clearly, the statutory mixed-motives analysis enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires jury instructions regarding motivating factor and the same-decision defense. The
concern expressed by the clerk here is that if pretext cases and mixed-motives cases yield
different jury instructions, the court should determine the type of case at summary judgment so that the standard of causation is the same at summary judgment and in the jury
instructions. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 n.9 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Magnuson, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir.) (explaining that
Desert Palace, which interpreted language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, does not affect
the application of Price Waterhouse to ADEA cases), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008).
47. Id.
48. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004).
49. Id.
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the statutes. 50 I think the Fifth Circuit did it as a matter of convenience."
"Clerk, my head is beginning to hurt. I am all for convenience, and I
think it may be in the interest of the courts and the public to simplify this
law, so apply the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to the race, sex,
and age disparate treatment claims. I see no reason why the analysis for
age discrimination claims should be different from race and sex."
"As you wish, Judge, but the Supreme Court consistently has said that
there are differences between age discrimination on the one hand, and
race and sex discrimination on the other. 51 For example, most recently
the Court reiterated this in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory.52 Still, on the specific issue of the proof structure applicable to intentional discrimination cases, I agree with you."
"Good! Then apply the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis and
prepare proposed reasons for judgment."
"Okay, Judge. Now about the reverse discrimination issue, how do you
want to handle that?"
"Apply the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis. Is there anything
else?"
"Yes, Judge. As you know, we have a white male asserting race and
sex discrimination claims. Do you want me to make adjustments to the
analysis because the claim is reverse discrimination, meaning a case with
group that historically has not been a
a plaintiff who is a member of a '53
primary target of discrimination?

"My word, Clerk, what adjustments would you make, and why would
you make them?"
"Some courts have modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis in reverse discrimination cases by requiring more proof to establish a prima
facie case. 54 Usually, courts that do this say that they require evidence of
em'background circumstances,' which suggest that this is an unusual
'55
group."
favored
historically
a
against
discriminates
that
ployer
50. See Gross, 526 F.3d at 361.
51. See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2402-03 (2008).

52. Id.
53. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof,46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1034-

36 (2004).
54. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1137 (1998); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See
also Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1036-37; Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That Separate Is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 995-96
(2000); Donald T.Kramer, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or National Origin
Discrimination Violative of Federal Constitution or Statutes-Private Employment Cases,
150 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1998); Ryan M. Peck, Title VII Is Color Blind: The Law of Reverse
Discrimination,75 J. KAN. B. A. 20, 27-28 (June 2006).
55. See, e.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).
See also Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1065-71 (discussing background circumstances).
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"Now, Clerk, why would we modify the analysis for reverse discrimination cases? Doing so seems discriminatory to me, which is quite ironic
given that we are trying to enforce antidiscrimination laws."
"Judge, some courts have refused to modify the analysis at least in
large part for that reason. 56 It is important to remember, however, that
employment discrimination law makes a number of distinctions, and thus
it obviously does discriminate. 57 The important question is whether there
is a solid rationale for distinguishing between the proof structure applied
to traditional discrimination cases and that applied to reverse discrimination cases. The best reason seems to be based on the presumptions underlying the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. As we discussed
earlier, all the prima facie case essentially requires is that a plaintiff prove
that she is in a protected class, is basically qualified for the job in question, and a job exists for which plaintiff was not chosen. Although this is
easily satisfied in most cases, the Court has explained that the prima facie
case rules out the two most common reasons for a person not getting a
job: no job exists or the person is not qualified.5 8 With the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons ruled out, the Court believed that discrimination occurs often enough to make it reasonable to infer discrimination,
subject to rebuttal. 59 However, that same inference may not be as reasonable for reverse discrimination because historically such discrimination has not been common. So, as you can see, when you think about the
underlying rationale for the proof structure, modifying the prima facie
case for reverse discrimination cases by requiring proof of additional
background circumstances makes sense. However, the modification has
been very controversial. One court expressed its consternation by saying
that cases which apply the background circumstances requirement in reverse discrimination cases are inconsistent with antidiscrimination
60
statutes."
"I understand, Clerk. I don't want to jump into that controversy, so
don't modify the prima facie case with a 'background circumstances' requirement even if it makes sense to do so. Besides, with more minorityowned businesses and the current emphasis on diversity in the workplace,
I suppose reverse discrimination may be more common than it used to be.
Are we done with the disparate treatment claims?"
"I think so, Judge, but if the age discrimination claim is a reverse discrimination claim, as it seems it may be, then we do not need to apply any
56. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1080-84.
57. For example, the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense applies to

sex, religion, national origin, and age, but not race and color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(2000) (Title VII BFOQ); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000) (ADEA BFOQ). Furthermore, the

Supreme Court has recognized that, under certain circumstances, employers can develop
and maintain affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara
County, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197
(1979); DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 440-41 (5th Cir. 2007).

58. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
59. Id.
60. See Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 2004).
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analysis to it. It can be dismissed as a matter of law. Younger people
cannot claim that they were discriminated against in favor of older people
on the basis of age."
"Now, wait a minute. Why not? The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) says 'age,' which could go either way-older or
younger. Furthermore, I know the Supreme Court has approved reverse
discrimination claims under Title VII.61
"Yes, Judge, that is all true, but the Supreme Court held that the
ADEA does not provide for reverse discrimination claims in GeneralDy62
namics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.
"That does not make sense to me. The statute says 'because of.
age,' 63 and does not say anything about younger or older. I recently read
about a British case in which a younger plaintiff sued for age discrimina'64
tion and won."
"Shall I write that, notwithstanding what the Court said in General Dynamics Land Systems, the ADEA should be interpreted to permit reverse
age discrimination claims and cite the British case?"
"No, Clerk, I don't think so. Some justices on the Supreme Court
don't like to see any foreign law cited. 65 If the age claim is a reverse
discrimination claim, grant the summary judgment for the defendant, citing GeneralDynamics Land Systems. Okay, surely that takes care of the
disparate treatment claims. Let's move on to disparate impact. This
should be much easier than disparate treatment because Congress codified the disparate impact proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.66
You know the three-part analysis: 1) prima facie case consisting of a) employment practice that b) causes c) a statistically significant disparity; 2)
employer's defense of business necessity and job relatedness; and 3) less
'67
discriminatory alternative employment practice."
"Judge, I know that is how courts see it, although the structure established by Congress in the Civil Right Act of 1991 is not that clear. For
example, the statute does not say that alternative employment practice
(AEP) is the third stage of a three-part analysis. As the statute is written,
"alternative employment practice" appears to be a freestanding theory of
liability rather than the third stage in an analysis. 68 Moreover, it is almost
impossible to separate AEP from business necessity and job relatedness
(BN/JR). How can a practice be a necessity if there is an alternative
practice available that is nearly as effective and less discriminatory?
61. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
62. 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
See Wilkinson v. Springwell Eng'g Ltd., ET/2507420/07.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-23 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). See Jan W. Henkel, The Age Discrimination in

Employment Act: Disparate Impact Analysis and the Availability of Liquidated Damages
After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1183, 1199 n.103 (1997).
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Courts generally have not been able to separate BN/JR and AEP into
69
two stages."
"Okay, well, treat BN/JR and AEP as two separate stages anyway.
Any more problems?"
"Working backwards, my biggest problem at stage two is that Congress
70
did not attempt to define BN/JR, and courts have struggled to define it.
As some have explained it, before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court seemed to apply a sliding scale approach to BN/JR, being
more deferential or less deferential to the employer depending on the
type of job and what was at stake in second guessing the employer's determination of business necessity. 71 Also, what did Congress have in
mind by making the defense two parts-business necessity and job related? Are we really supposed to analyze both? Can a practice be a business necessity without being job related? Isn't job related redundant?"
"Clerk, I understand, but the statutory language is crystal clear. Even
if you think job related is redundant, analyze both. As far as the appropriate standard for BN/JR, survey the case law and pick one. Any other
problems?"
"Yes, regarding the prima facie case, there are problems with all three
parts. First, what constitutes an employment practice is not clear. For
example, the Supreme Court, in the case first holding that disparate impact is actionable under the ADEA, Smith v. City of Jackson, held that
the employer's pay raise formula was not an employment practice.7 2 One
could attribute that to its being an age case, but what constitutes an employment practice also has been vexing in Title VII cases. For example,
in EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, the Eleventh Circuit said it found no employment practice in the employer's hiring procedures,7 3 although the dis'74
sent had no difficulty finding practices.
"So you will have to apply an amorphous standard to what constitutes
an employment practice. Just add that to the amorphous standard for the
defense of BN/JR. What are the problems with the rest of the PFC?"
69. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 1993).
There is not much Supreme Court precedent to provide guidance on "alternative employment practice." The Civil Rights Act provides that the law of "alternative employment
practice" is to be "in accordance with the law as it existed" before Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio was decided. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) & (C). However, Wards Cove was

the first Supreme Court opinion to use the term "alternative employment practice." See,
e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 964 (2005). Wards Cove used the term to explain the third
stage of the disparate impact analysis as articulated in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See William Gordon, The Evolution of the DisparateImpact Theory
of Title VIP A Hypothetical Case Study, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 529, 541 (2007).
70. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 670
(2007) ("The conflict over the appropriate scope of the business justification defense is
longstanding.").

71.
72.
73.
74.

See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-41 (2005).
EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1289-91 (Hull, J., dissenting).
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"The Supreme Court announced a specific causation standard in Wards
Cove Packing v. Atonio, saying that the plaintiff must 'specifically show[ ]
that each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact.' 75 Although Congress overturned most of Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act
76
of 1991, it appears to have codified the specific causation requirement.
Here's the problem in this case: the plaintiff claims disparate impact in
refusal to hire based on race, sex, and age. Let's put the age disparate
impact claim to one side because it must be analyzed according to a different disparate impact proof structure. As for the race and sex claims,
there is a problem because the employer has many more men and whites
in the job classification for which plaintiff was denied employment and
many more men and whites in its workforce as a whole. Therefore, it
seems that under the specific causation standard plaintiff cannot prove
that any specific practice of the employer caused a statistically significant
underrepresentation."
"Ah, checkmate, Clerk. The Supreme Court explained in Connecticut
v. Teal that the bottom line cannot be used to defeat a claim of discrimination. 77 That is, if a practice or criterion is excluding a group disproportionately, it is no answer that the group is proportionately represented in
the employer's workforce."
"True, Judge, but how do you reconcile that principle with Livingston
v. Roadway Express, Inc.?78 In that case, the employer had a maximum
height requirement for drivers. 7 9 The tall male applicant who was denied
a job sued, asserting disparate impact.80 The court rejected his claim, noting that the employer's workforce had 189 male drivers and two female
drivers. 81 The court tried to distinguish Connecticut v. Teal, but the
ground of distinction made no difference. 82 Then the court buttressed its
conclusion that the claim failed by noting that the case was a reverse discrimination case and saying the background circumstances requirement
applicable to disparate treatment reverse discrimination cases also ap'83
plies to disparate impact cases."
"I admit that Livingston poses some enigmas. How do you resolve
them, Clerk?"
"Livingston exemplifies a couple of the most significant unresolved issues about disparate impact. First, is disparate impact really about individual rights rather than group rights? In Connecticut v. Teal, the Court
insisted that employment discrimination law protects individual rights,
not group rights. 84 The dissent in Teal disagreed, saying the Court was
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) & (B)(ii) (2000).
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982).
Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id. at 1252-53.
Id.
Id.
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982).
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confusing the goal of Title VII with the legal theories for accomplishing
that goal; while disparate treatment is about proving discrimination
against individuals, disparate impact is about proving discrimination with
reference to a group. 85' If disparate impact is about protecting individuals
against discrimination only as members of a group, then Livingston
makes sense, as the employer hired many men and certainly did not discriminate against men. On the other hand, if disparate impact protects
individuals as individuals, then the plaintiff should have recovered. Second, in what group must the disparate impact be manifested: the actual
workforce of the employer or some hypothetical group mirroring the general public that could have applied for the job? 86 In Livingston, for example, there was no underrepresentation of men in the employer's
workforce, 8 7 although everyone knows that a height limitation would disproportionately screen out men in a hypothetical applicant pool. In Livingston, looking at the PFC from the top (from the employment practice
downward) it looks like a fairly strong disparate impact case. However,
looking at it from the bottom (from the workforce upward) it looks like a
nonexistent disparate impact case. There is yet another issue in Livingston. Should disparate impact theory even apply to reverse discrimination cases? 8 8 Although the court stated that it would impose the
additional background circumstances requirement for disparate impact in
reverse discrimination cases, 89 the court could have considered whether
disparate impact even was intended to protect members of groups against
whom there is no history of discrimination. This is a very controversial
issue which also may raise constitutional concerns. So far, the scant case
law on the issue recognizes the applicability of disparate impact to reverse discrimination cases, 90 but the issue has not been thoroughly discussed in a difficult case. Because there are more Caucasians and men in
the job classification for which the plaintiff applied, we may have such a
case."
"Clerk, what constitutional issues are implicated if I rule that disparate
impact does not apply to reverse discrimination cases?"
"The argument is that a judicial decision limiting disparate impact to
traditional discrimination cases is a racial classification that is subject to
strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause, and therefore
probably constitutionally infirm. 91 However, there are arguments in the
85. Id. at 458-59 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86. See Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of DisparateImpact Discrimination,59 FORDHAM
L. REV. 523, 564-570 (1991); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, DemonstratingDisparateImpact: A View of the Model, Through New Lenses, 14 N.C. L. REV. 325,
356 (1995).
87. Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252.
88. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004).
89. Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252.
90. Id.; Craig v. Ala. State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 683-85 (11th Cir. 1986).
91. See Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1550.
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academic literature to the contrary. '92
"Clerk, we will not risk that constitutional fight. We will apply disparate impact to the reverse discrimination claims in the case before us
without discussing the issue, much as the court did in Livingston. However, do not add the background circumstances requirement."
"Okay, your Honor. You are aware, of course, that the disparate impact analysis under the ADEA is different from that under Title VII. At
a minimum, the statutory language requires that the defense of "reasonable factors other than age" (RFOA) replace business necessity and job
relatedness as the applicable affirmative defense. 93 In Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratorythe Supreme Court recently explained this difference and the fact that there is no stage three rebuttal in the analysis
analogous to "alternative employment practices. '94 Indeed, until the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, it was not re95
solved that disparate impact theory was available under the ADEA.
The Supreme Court's explanation of the ADEA disparate impact analy96
sis in Smith seems to make it very unlikely that plaintiffs will prevail.
The Court, however, did clarify in Meacham that RFOA is an affirmative
'97
defense for which the burden of persuasion is on the defendant.
"So, Clerk, I question why the Supreme Court and Congress have disfavored age discrimination by making it harder for plaintiffs to recover,
but I accept your explanation of the differences."
"You realize the analysis I do under both disparate treatment and disparate impact will be fraught with uncertainty, Judge?"
"Yes, Clerk, I now understand that, but I find it baffling that Congress
and the Supreme Court have not heretofore seen fit to provide certainty
regarding the basic tools we must use at the key stages in litigation of
employment discrimination cases." 98
"Well, your Honor, Congress stepped up to the plate and did significant revamping and clarification of both disparate impact and disparate
treatment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Perhaps it will do so again.
But I should begin work on your opinion because that hope does not help
us now."
92. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and DisparateImpact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 515 (2003).

93. 29 U.S.C § 623(f)(1) (2000).
94. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404-05 (2008).
95. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
96. See, e.g., Jessica Sturgeon, Note, Smith v. City of Jackson: Setting an Unreasonable
Standard, 56 DUKE L.J. 1377, 1396-1401 (2007).
97. Meacham, 128 S.Ct. at 2404.
98. See Michael Abbott, Note, A Swing and a Miss: The U.S. Supreme Court's Attempt
to Resolve the Confusion Over the ProperEvidentiary Burden for Employment Discrimination Litigation in Costa v. Desert Palace, 30 J. CORP. L. 573, 591 (2005) ("Overall, with
lower courts already making their own differing interpretations of Costa's effects, it appears that the only thing clear in the area of employment discrimination law is the existence of confusion.").
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II.

HOW DID THE WRECK OCCUR?

The odyssey of the proof structures is well chronicled, 99 so I will render
it here in succinct form.
A.

DISPARATE TREATMENT: PRETEXT AND MIXED MOTIVES FROM
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND PRICE WATERHOUSE TO THE
CIVIL RIGHTS

AcT

OF

1991

TO DESERT PALACE

The two proof structures were created by the Supreme Court, the pretext structure in McDonnell Douglas v. Green'00 in 1973, and the mixedmotives structure in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'01 in 1989. Although
both were created by the Court, mixed-motives later would be modified
10 2
and codified by Congress.
The Court held the pretext analysis applicable in a reverse discrimination case without much discussion of how it applies in McDonald v. Santa

Fe Trail Transportation Co. 10 3 The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis
was further developed in a series of Supreme Court decisions: Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,10 4 St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,10 5 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.106 The Supreme Court never has held that the pretext analysis is applicable to analyze ADEA cases (although it has assumed it), 10 7 and lower courts
routinely have applied it. The Court seems to have approved the applicability of the pretext analysis to disabilities claims under the ADA in Ray10 8
theon Co. v. Hernandez.

The court announced the alternative proof structure, mixed motives, in
Price Waterhouse. The plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence applied different standards to the plaintiff's prima facie case, "motivating factor" applied by the plurality, 10 9 and "substantial factor" by the
concurrence. 110 After Price Waterhouse, most courts applied substantial
factor. Courts also grappled with the issue of under which proof structure
any particular case should be analyzed. Most circuits seized upon the
99. One of the best presentations is in Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination
Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887,18921909 (2004).
100. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
101. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-42 (1989).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 112-115.
103. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976).
104. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 256 (1981).
105. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 510-11 (1993).
106. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
107. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) ("In assessing
claims of age discrimination brought under the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others, has
applied some variant of the basic evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.
We have never had occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the
ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume
it.").
108. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53, 55 (2003).
109. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
110. Id. at 265 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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dividing line cited by the O'Connor concurrence: cases in which there was
direct evidence were analyzed under mixed-motives, and circumstantial
evidence cases were analyzed under pretext.' 1 '
Congress made some changes in at least one disparate treatment proof
structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Given the splintered Court decision in Price Waterhouse, Congress clarified and fixed the mixed-motives proof structure. Congress codified "motivating factor" as the
causation standard in the plaintiff's prima face case rather than "substantial factor. 11 2 Congress also changed the analysis of Price Waterhouse by
providing that the same-decision defense is not a complete defense,
avoiding liability. 113 Instead, liability is still imposed even if the employer
satisfies its burden on the same-decision defense, but the effect is a limitation on the remedies that are available. 1 4 Did Congress intend in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to make any changes in the pretext analysis?
Congress did not say. Did the new statutory version of mixed motives
apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which was not
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991? Congress did not say, but it
placed the new statutory analysis in Title VII. Thus, many courts said
that the Price Waterhouse version of mixed motives continued to apply to
1 5
ADEA disparate treatment claims.
As long as courts maintained a dividing line between cases to be analyzed under pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed motives, it was
reasonable for courts to continue using the two proof structures and the
rich body of case law developed under them. However, the Supreme
Court obliterated this order when it held in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
that direct evidence is not required for a plaintiff to be entitled to a motivating factor jury instruction. 116 With that holding, the Court erased the
line separating the cases analyzed under pretext and those analyzed
under mixed motives. The Court based its holding on the fact that the
language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not say anything
about "motivating factor" being limited to direct evidence cases. 117 Did
elimination of the dividing line mean that all disparate treatment cases
were to be analyzed under mixed motives? The Court declined to say." 8
The lower courts were left with no guidance on deciding what to do with
the two disparate treatment proof structures.

111. Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
114. Id. The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with no money, although at-

torney's fees may be awarded.
115. See, e.g., Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005).
116. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
117. Id. at 99.
118. In fact the Court said: "This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107
applies outside of the mixed-motive context." Id. at 94 n.1.
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DISPARATE IMPACT: FROM GRIGGS TO WARDS COVE TO THE

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

The history of disparate impact starts with the Supreme Court's recognition of the theory in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 119 Between
Griggs and the codification of .disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, several major Supreme Court cases developed the proof structure.
In 1982 in Connecticut v. Teal, the Court announced that if an employment practice causes a disparate impact, an employer cannot defend and
win the case by fixing the disparate impact at the bottom line-by adjusting its numbers so that the group adversely affected by the practice is
adequately represented in the work force or job classification. 120 In 1988
in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, the Court held that disparate impact analysis applies to subjective employment practices. 12 1 Then, in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio in 1989, the Court radically changed
the disparate impact analysis, making business necessity easier to satisfy
and placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff. 122 Congress took
aim at Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and created a statutory
version of the disparate impact proof structure that modified most of the
Wards Cove version of the analysis, except the requirement of specific
causation between the employment practice and the statistical disparity.t 23 Unfortunately, the statutory version developed by Congress presumed that the terms it used, such as "business necessity," "job related,"
and "alternative employment practice" were adequately defined by preWards Cove case law. They were not. The Court held in Smith v. City of
Jackson' 24 in 2005 that the disparate impact analysis, although not the
one created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is applicable under the
ADEA. The Court continued to clarify the differences between the
ADEA and Title VII analyses in 2008 in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
125
Power Laboratory.
III.

LEGISLATIVELY FIXING THE PROOF STRUCTURES
A.

LEGISLATE LIKE IT'S

1991

The proof structures, even the ones retrofitted in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, are fraught with problems, enigmas, and conundrums. 126 These
frameworks are used by attorneys and judges to analyze all employment

discrimination cases, and they are used by courts to rule on dispositive
motions and to instruct juries. Thus, employment discrimination law is
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982).
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404-05 (2008).
See supra Part I.B.
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badly broken and in desperate need of repair. 127
Congress must answer the call and repair the law by repairing the proof
structures.' 28 Why Congress rather than the Supreme Court? First, obviously Congress is better able to repair all the problems in one piece of
legislation, whereas the Court would have to find cases presenting the
issues and grant certiorari in a number of cases to fix them all. The
problems are numerous enough and fundamental enough that they
should be repaired in one fell swoop. While one may argue that problems
can be resolved by the courts by permitting time for experimentation, this
repair work is long overdue. Second, not only is the Court unable to deal
with all of the problems in a short period of time, it has not demonstrated
a willingness to fix the problems it could have fixed over long periods of
time. The Court has not clarified the effect of Desert Palace on the disparate treatment proof structures since 2003, although there have been petitions for certiorari in cases raising the issue. 129 The Court has not
decided a disparate impact case under Title VII since the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 was enacted. Finally, Congress demonstrated in the 1991 Act that
it can identify specific problems (created by specific Supreme Court decisions) and fix them in a single piece of legislation. Congress recently acted to repair employment discrimination law with the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.130 One may respond that the
political wrangling surrounding the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and
the successful 1991 Act demonstrates a weakness of Congress that led to
127. The lamentations regarding the state of the proof structures are numerous. For a
recent article bemoaning the disparate treatment mess and surveying earlier critiques, see
Prenkert, supra note 26, at 512.
128. In a recent article, Professor Martin Katz provided a way that the lower courts
could fix the disparate treatment "quagmire." See Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate
Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 659-81 (2008). Professor Katz stated, however,
that a legislative solution was preferable. Id. at 659. I argue that legislative action is necessary to repair the broken proof structures of both disparate treatment and disparate impact. This is a big project that requires Congress to survey the big picture of employment
discrimination law and choose how to fix it. Furthermore, when considering disparate
treatment alone, Congress needs to make some decisions about the appropriate repair. I
am not sure that the existing statutory proof structure (the motivating factor and samedecision defense analysis added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) should be applied to all
cases without some changes being made, which is what Professor Katz proposes courts
should do.
129. See supra note 29.
130. Congress enacted and the President signed into law the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, which broadened the definition of disability by overturning several specific Supreme Court decisions. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101). The
Act modifies the definitions of "disability," "impairment," and "major life activities," and
adds standards for determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555-56. It overturns the Supreme Court decisions in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures are to be
taken into account in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity), and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding
that for an impairment to substantially limit the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, the impairment must prevent or restrict one from performing tasks "of central importance to most people's daily lives," and the impairment must be "permanent or long
term"). § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553-54.
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some of the current problems. 131 While that is true, the 1991 Act is still
impressive for its recognition of fundamental problems with the proof
structures revealed by the existing case law and its attempt to address
them by drawing on the available case law. Thus, it is time for Congress
to fix employment discrimination law as it did in the Civil Rights Act of
1991. As in 1991, the fix will not resolve all issues well, but Congress has
the superior competence to fix numerous problems identified by and de1 32
veloped in the case law.
Before suggesting the specific changes that I think Congress should
make, I offer a few observations regarding the limited scope of what this
Article proposes. First, this is more about mechanics than theory, and a
repair rather than building something new. Much academic scholarship
focuses on theory to explain the failures and deficiencies of current employment discrimination law, 133 and some go on to use theory to recommend reconceptualizations of the law. 134 While those endeavors are
important and worthwhile, rather than building something new, I will
limit the changes to fixing problems with current parts. A related point is
that the repairs I recommend, like the approach Congress took in 1991,
will use available parts and not anything that must be custom ordered.
The changes that I recommend do not effect a reconceptualization or
reinvention of employment discrimination law; instead, they are directed
at the more modest goal, for example, of selecting from among the causation standards that have been used by the courts the best one in view of
the state of the law and society. These repairs will make employment
discrimination law more certain, predictable, and functional.
In reworking the familiar law, however, Congress should draft carefully, recognizing that courts and lawyers in general do not like changes.
131. See supra note 7 for a discussion regarding the veto of the 1990 Act and passage
and signing of the 1991 Act. Several of the problems with the proof structures can be
traced to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. For example, the Supreme Court in Desert Palace
eradicated the line dividing cases analyzed under pretext and those analyzed under mixed
motives based on its interpretation of the 1991 Act-to be precise, what the Civil Rights
Act did not say (that direct evidence is required for a case to come under mixed motives).
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003). The debate over whether changes
wrought in the disparate treatment and impact proof structures by the 1991 Act apply to
the ADEA stem from the fact that the Act was silent on that issue. The uncertainty of the
courts over the proper standard for business necessity and job relatedness goes to the tortuous and ineffective draftsmanship in the 1991 Act after political wrangling on that issue.
132. Professor Prenkert has argued that Congressional action is needed to repair the
mess of disparate treatment law. See Prenkert, supra note 26, at 560-61. Among the reasons Professor Prenkert cites are the following: (1) Congress needs to clarify by statute the
standard of causation required for employment discrimination, thus producing uniformity
among the employment discrimination statutes; (2) Congress has demonstrated its competence to fix courts' interpretations with which it disagrees; (3) courts have demonstrated
that they "are not up to the task"; and (4) there is a "growing concern about some of the
Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the civil rights statutes." Id. at 562-63.
133. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008).
134. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.

1161 (1995); Oppenheimer, supra note 4.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

They are conservative by nature, and they cling to that with which they
are familiar. That conservatism can result in lawyers and judges interpreting the new law as more or less preserving the old law. For example,
I thought that Desert Palace made it clear (though implicitly) that the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis could not be maintained as it had
before that decision. I also predicted, however, that courts and lawyers
would tenaciously hold on to the analysis that had become common and
comfortable in its thirty-plus years of existence. 135 Thus, Congress should
be clear about changes that it is making to existing law. On the other
hand, the conservatism of judges and lawyers also can work to rectify
shortcomings in the legislation. For example, the proof structure for disparate impact in the 1991 Act 136 does not clearly set forth the three-part
analysis that Congress probably intended and that courts have interpreted it as codifying. However, because Congress used terms and concepts developed in the existing case law, courts have resorted to the prior
case law in interpreting the legislation. 13 7 This limited repair job, using
the existing parts of employment discrimination law, will not give us a
new Rolls Royce employment discrimination law, but we should be satisfied at this stage in the development of the law with a smooth-running
version of the Chevy or Ford we took in to the shop. We won't be as
worried about what happens to it when we take it out and drive it around
every day.
And now, we begin the repair job.
B.

FIXING DISPARATE TREATMENT

Because most employment discrimination cases are individual disparate treatment cases and the mystery of what proof structure applies was
raised by a Supreme Court opinion, this is the most important and most
needed repair. As a starting point, Congress codified the mixed-motives
proof structure with a "motivating factor" standard and a same-decision
limitation on remedies in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.138 The Supreme
Court in Desert Palace read this amendment as not limiting the "motivating factor" standard to cases involving direct evidence. With the dividing
line between cases analyzed under mixed motives and those analyzed
under pretext erased, someone needs to say whether both proof structures continue to exist, and if they do, what is the new dividing line. In
the aftermath of Desert Palace,Congress could do any of the following: 1)
preserve the two proof structures and either overturn Desert Palace by
reinstalling the prior direct evidence-circumstantial evidence dividing line
or creating a new one; 2) merge the two analyses into one new one along
the lines of what the Fifth Circuit did in Rachid v. Jack in the BOX1 3 9 ; or 3)
135. See Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, supra note 27, at 219.

136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) & (B) (2000).
137. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) & § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
139. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004); see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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abrogate the pretext analysis by expressly making a single statutory proof
structure applicable to all individual disparate treatment cases, and consider any modifications of the current mixed-motives statutory structure
(the one created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) that seem advisable in
light of the abrogation of the pretext analysis and adoption of a single
standard.
I urge that Congress choose the third option: dispensing with the pretext analysis and making the statutory mixed-motives analysis applicable
to all disparate treatment cases. I suggest some modifications of the current statutory version of mixed motives, but I would retain the basic twostep framework. Because the mixed-motives analysis has been used by
courts since the earlier version was articulated by the Supreme Court in
1989 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, courts have experience with the
analysis and should not require much guidance.
Because my proposed fix of the disparate treatment proof structures is
not the choice of courts today, I first discuss why the other options should
be rejected by Congress. Then I turn to my proposal.
1. Congress Should Not Change the Result of Desert Palace
Option 1 should not be chosen. Although the holding of Desert Palace,
that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not require direct evidence to invoke the mixed-motives proof structure, is not the only possible interpretation of the 1991 amendment, Desert Palaceon balance did a good thing.
It does not appear that Congress had any notion of abrogating the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or erasing the well-known dividing line
between pretext cases and mixed-motives cases with the 1991 amendments. Instead, the codification of mixed motives was directed at fixing
the proof structure articulated by the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse.140 However, I do not think that Congress should choose option 1 above, overturning DesertPalace or preserving the pretext analysis.
Regardless of whether one likes the McDonnell Douglas pretext or
mixed-motives proof structure better, the two proof structures were divided by a chimerical line that no one really understood or applied effectively.1 41 As the Ninth Circuit explained in its en banc opinion in Desert
Palace,14 2 there were several approaches applied by the various circuits to
defining the direct-circumstantial dividing line. The suggestion of a new
dividing line, such as single-motive and mixed-motives cases, is not any
more helpful because all cases present themselves as potential mixed-motives cases when the employer introduces evidence of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 143 Thus, Desert Palace actually did a good thing by
erasing an ineffective and artificial dividing line, even if it misinterpreted
what Congress intended to do in the 1991 Act.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 27, at 92-93.
See Zimmer, supra note 99, at 1912-13
299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
See Chambers, supra note 27, at 96-97; Zimmer, supra note 99, at 1923, 1927-28.
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Congress Should Not Codify a Proof Structure That Merges Pretext
and Mixed Motives

How about option 2-codifying the Rachid solution of merging proof
structures? Congress should consider this as an option, but ultimately, I
recommend rejecting it. There are reasons to choose this option. The
first thing that favors it is that it would preserve the pretext analysis that
the courts love and to which they desperately are clinging. This is no
small reason to preserve it. Courts have a rich body of case law and experience with it. Second, if plaintiffs have the option of going the pretext
route at stage three rather than motivating factor, they may avoid the
introduction of the same-decision defense and the limitation of remedies
if that defense is successful. 144 However, that poses the additional problem of what a plaintiff must do to preclude the same-decision defense in a
given case and how the court makes the decision about the applicability
45
of the same-decision defense; the issue of the dividing line reemerges.1
The merged analysis and the preservation of the pretext analysis share
several negatives. First, the pretext analysis is more difficult for plaintiffs
to satisfy than the motivating factor standard of the mixed-motives proof
structure. Although there is a debate about what level of causation the
pretext analysis entails, 146 it should suffice to say that it has been the
understanding since Price Waterhouse that the mixed-motives proof structure was intended to give plaintiffs who could avail themselves of it an
advantage over plaintiffs proceeding under pretext, at least at the prima
facie case stage, and plaintiffs have sought the mixed-motives analysis,
believing it to be favorable. 147 If you tell a plaintiff that she can prevail
by proving either motivating factor or pretext, you may as well dispense
14 8
with pretext.
144. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, supra note 27, at 216-19.
145. Professor Martin Katz has argued that no choice is required. See Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 167-68 (2007). He argues that the pretext
analysis is no longer mandatory, but plaintiffs can use it as a way to prove motivating
factor. No doubt he is correct that plaintiffs can introduce evidence of pretext to prove
discrimination. However, retaining the proof structure, which has shifting burdens of production and case law regarding the meaning of each stage, is a mistake. Professor Katz
argues for retention of a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. I think a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglasis a way of saying the pretext evidence is relevant to the motivating factor
standard of causation (which is certainly true), and we can keep the proof structure without requiring plaintiffs to use it (which is problematic and destined to preserve confusion).
My response to Professor Katz is that plaintiffs do not need the pretext proof structure
preserved in order to render evidence of pretext relevant to discrimination under a motivating factor (or other causation) standard.
146. Although the pretext analysis has been understood as incorporating a but-for standard of causation, Professor Katz has argued that the pretext analysis actually incorporates
a motivating factor standard of causation. See Katz, supra note 145, at 136-38. He does
concede, however, that a "strong version" of the pretext analysis proves but-for causation.
Id. at 139.

147. In Desert Palace v. Costa, for example, the issue that got the case to the Supreme
Court was the plaintiff's argument that she was entitled to a mixed-motives jury instruction, notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence.
148. Professor Katz agues that this is wrong because, when pretext is properly understood and used, a plaintiff is not required to choose pretext or mixed motives. See Katz,
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Second, the McDonnell Douglas analysis, notwithstanding its long service, has significant problems. The prima facie case is the biggest problem. It was established and has remained low and easy to satisfy1 49 and
consequently is not predictive of whether a plaintiff has a case on which
she is likely to prevail at trial or even survive summary judgment. 150 All
one has to prove essentially is that there is a job and the plaintiff is basically qualified for it. The Supreme Court considered raising the requirements for the prima facie case and perhaps attempted to do so in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 51 but failed to do so. The
easily satisfied prima facie case seems to be the reason that many courts
have imposed an additional background circumstances requirement in reverse discrimination cases; the light prima facie case does not support an
inference of prohibited discrimination against a plaintiff who is not a
member of a group against which there has been a history of
52
discrimination.1
A federal court of appeals recently expressed the futility of and frustration caused by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case:
Much ink has been spilled regarding the proper contours of the
prima-facie-case aspect of McDonnell Douglas. But as we read the
Supreme Court precedents ... the prima facie case is a largely unnecessary sideshow. It has not benefited employees or employers;
nor has it simplified or expedited court proceedings. In fact, it has
enormous confusion and wastdone exactly the opposite, spawning
153
ing litigant and judicial resources.
A rejoinder to the futility of the prima facie case is that it forces an employer, which generally may fire employees at will, to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, thus giving
the plaintiff a "target. '154 The short answer to this is that, regardless of
employment at will, almost every employer that is sued for discrimination
offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and this would be true
without stages one and two of the pretext proof structure.
supra note 145, at 166. Professor Katz and I actually do not disagree on this because he
says that those who argue that a mandatory McDonnell Douglas is dead are correct. Id. at
167. My point is that leaving McDonnell Douglas as a viable proof structure makes it more
meaningful and influential procedurally than it should be; that is, courts accustomed to a
mandatory version of McDonnell Douglas will continue to apply it that way.
149. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993); Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 2229,
2245-50 (1995).
150. See, e.g., Stephen W. Smith, Title Vi's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie
Case for the Prima Facie Case? 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 377-78 (1997).
151. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
152. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1061-65.
153. Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But
see Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 & n.12 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting that the court reserves the right to undertake each step in the analysis and that it

"has not infrequently dismissed such claims for failure to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation").
154. See Katz, supra note 145, at 183.
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While part two of the pretext analysis, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason, has not been very problematic, the long-running debate about
part three demonstrates another problem with the analysis. The pretextonly/pretext-plus debate was waged in law review articles and Supreme
Court decisions.1 55 The Supreme Court eventually in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,Inc. left us with no categorical answer; that is, the
Court said that evidence of pretext ordinarily would be enough to survive
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, but not necessarily
always. 156 One may think that we can live with the Reeves interpretation
of the third stage, but problems remain with the meaning and effect of
pretext. For example, in what types of cases is pretext evidence not suffi15 7
cient to get a case to the fact finder?
In the end, Congress should reject a merged proof structure or the
preservation of pretext as a proof structure because 1) the two proof
structures have a history of operating as two different analyses and cannot be blended effectively; and 2) there are enough problems with the
pretext analysis that it should not be retained.
3.

Congress Should Adopt One Statutory Proof Structure Applicable to
All Disparate Treatment Cases

The issue all along has been what a plaintiff must do to prove that
employment discrimination occurred because of race, sex, etc. The Supreme Court and lower courts have addressed this issue in terms of standards of causation. Congress installed a statutory standard in the 1991
Act- "motivating factor." The second stage of the analysis provides that
employers may avail themselves of the same-decision defense, which if
the defendant is successful will limit remedies, eliminating all monetary
remedies to the plaintiff. If Congress were to follow my recommendations and eliminate the pretext proof structure and choose to establish
one statutory proof structure for all disparate treatment cases, the current
statutory mixed-motives structure seems to be a good starting point. Because it is itself a modification of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives
analysis, courts have experience applying it. But before recommending
that Congress simply amend the statute to say the current statutory
mixed-motives analysis applies to all intentional discrimination cases, it is
worth asking whether changes should be made in light of the fact that the
pretext proof structure will be gone. In the 1991 Act, Congress clearly
indicated the way in which it wished to modify the Price Waterhouse
mixed-motives analysis. However, if Congress also had thought it were
abolishing the pretext analysis and replacing it with a unified analysis, it
155. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses:
The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule In Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTnNG
L.J. 57 (1991); Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the

Basic Assumption, 26

CONN.

L.

REV.

997 (1994).

156. See 530 U.S. 133, 134-36 (2000).
157. See id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (speculating that the Court may have to
provide guidance on this issue in a future opinion).
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might have done things differently. Thus, Congress should consider modifications to the current statutory proof structure.
a.

Congress Should Consider the Standard of Causation in the
Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case but Ultimately Retain
Motivating Factor

When Congress passed the 1991 Act it chose "motivating factor" as the
standard of causation from the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion rather
than "substantial factor" from Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence. Should the express abrogation of pretext and adoption of a
unified proof structure call for the adoption of a different and more demanding standard of causation, such as substantial factor? That is a policy question for Congress, but I think the best answer is for Congress to
retain "motivating factor" for at least two reasons. First, Congress should
not amend the employment discrimination statutes to make it harder for
plaintiffs to recover. The data indicates that employment discrimination
15 8
cases are harder for plaintiffs to win than most other civil litigation.
Second, the second stage of the statutory mixed-motives proof structure,
the same-decision defense, incorporates a but-for causation standard
(with the burden on the defendant) for the purpose of limiting remedies. 159 Thus, the current analysis has a lenient causation standard at the
first stage and a more stringent standard at the second stage. These causation standards should be maintained.
b.

Congress Should Change the Effect of the Same-Decision
Defense

Under Price Waterhouse, the same-decision defense at stage two was a
complete defense to liability. In the 1991 Act, Congress changed that and
made it more favorable to plaintiffs by making same decision a limitation
on remedies rather than a complete defense. However, the limitation on
remedies is substantial, leaving the plaintiff without any money (except
possibly attorneys' fees) if the defendant prevails on same decision.
When the mixed-motives proof structure was applicable to only a subset
of disparate treatment cases, that significant limitation was perhaps not so
troublesome, and after all, Congress had modified it from a complete defense. As the next step in the evolution of proof structures, as Congress
makes mixed motives the only proof structure applicable in disparate
treatment cases, Congress should again alter the same-decision defense.
What should be the effect when a plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor and the defendant proves that the charac158. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). One may argue that the loss rate for plaintiffs is attributable to an abundance of frivolous lawsuits and the decline of the occurrence of employment discrimination on invidious bases in the modern workplace, but that argument seems
unfounded. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 99, at 1943-45.
159. Katz, supra note 128, at 658.
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teristic was not a but-for cause? Congress could reduce the remedy
limitation, making it possible for a plaintiff to recover a monetary
remedy.
I recommend one of two possibilities: 1) the same-decision defense cuts
off compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief of reinstatement (instatement, promotion, etc.) and front pay, but not backpay; or 2)
the same-decision defense cuts off punitive damages and injunctive relief
such as reinstatement, but not backpay and compensatory damages. I
favor the second of these options because the remedy for disparate treatment should provide relief for lost wages and compensation for emotional distress injuries that makes the plaintiff whole. This is the result
that seems most consistent with the 1991 Act's enhancing of the remedies
available under Title VII and the ADA by providing for damages (subject
to a cap). Yet another possibility for modifying the same-decision defense may stem from legislation that already has been introduced in Congress. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 2008160 would remove the
damage caps created by the 1991 Act. 16 1 If that were to become the law
generally, Congress could modify the same-decision defense to provide
that when the defendant satisfies it, the cap on compensatory and puni162
tive damages would become applicable.
c. Congress Should Adopt the Modified Mixed-Motives Structure
for All Cases (and Not Modify it for Reverse
Discrimination Cases)
The issue of whether and how to modify the proof structure in disparate treatment reverse discrimination cases is important and contentious.
As discussed above, courts and others on both sides of this issue can become passionate. 163 Indeed, this is an issue on which employment discrimination law can look very unfair to the general public. Fortunately,
by adopting a single proof structure based on the current mixed-motives
analysis, this problem can be obviated. Courts have adopted the background circumstances requirement in large part because of the very easily
satisfied prima face case of the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. The
motivating factor standard (or substantial factor, if Congress so chooses)
seems an adequate standard for all discrimination cases, traditional or
reverse, with no need for background circumstances. Although background circumstances perhaps could be required under a motivating fac160. H.R. 2159, 110th Cong. (2008). See Democrats Introduce Wide-Ranging Bill to
Bolster Employment Rights and Remedies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at A-3 (Jan. 28,

2008).
161. The caps are based on number of employees of the employer, and they apply to
disability claims and Title VII claims seeking jury trials and damages under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). Race discrimination cases brought pursuant to Section 1981 are not subject to the caps.
162. Because the caps of § 1981a are not applicable to race discrimination claims seeking damages under § 1981, this approach would require deciding whether to make race
claims in which the defendant prevailed on the same-decision defense subject to the caps.
163. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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tor standard, there is no case law on this issue. Moreover, it is the
specificity of the elements of the pretext structure that suggests the need
for and accommodates the addition of background circumstances as an
additional element. It is the nonspecificity of a "motivating factor" standard that invites introduction of all relevant evidence but accommodates
no additional elements. 164
d.

Congress Should Provide that the New Codified Proof Structure
Applies to Disparate Treatment Claims Under All the
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws

The idea that a Price Waterhouse version of the mixed-motives analysis
applies to age discrimination claims under the ADEA is based on the fact
that Congress in the 1991 Act did not amend the ADEA. 165 This fact has
not prevented some courts from applying a uniform mixed-motives analysis to Title VII and ADEA disparate treatment cases. 166 Congress should
resolve this issue by expressly providing that the one new proof structure
applies to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, Section 1981, the
ADEA, and the ADA. I can think of no good reason why intentional
discrimination cases should be analyzed differently under these statutes. 167 Although the disparate impact analysis is a bit different under
Title VII and the ADEA,'1 68 that is because the ADEA expressly provides for a different defense: "reasonable factors other than age" rather
than business necessity/job relatedness. There is no reason in statutory
language or policy that supports adopting a different proof structure for
intentional discrimination cases.
1 69
The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in Rachid v. Jack in the Box
when it applied its modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to an age case,
reasoning that any changes wrought by Desert Palace v. Costa were intended by the Court to apply equally to the ADEA. The similarity in
language and purpose among the discrimination statutes should provide
Congress adequate reason to make one proof structure applicable to
all. 170 If more reason is needed, simplicity and economy should be considered desirable bonuses. Employment discrimination law is complicated enough.
164. The Third Circuit recently held that a plaintiff in a mixed-motives case must prove
that he has the basic qualifications for the job. See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205 (3d
Cir. 2008). While recognizing the relevance of that evidence to the claim, the court stated
that it did not need to decide whether a mixed-motives plaintiff must prove each of the
elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.
165. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 128, at 666-80.
166. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
167. See Prenkert, supra note 26, passim.
168. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2396-97 (2008).
169. 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
170. Professor Katz argues that a single mixed-motives analysis is supported by the following: the fact that the Supreme Court defined the causation standard in Price
Waterhouse; that Congress reformed that causation standard in the Civil Rights Act of
1991; and the assumption of uniformity among the statutes. See Katz, supra note 128, at
669-70.
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FIXING DISPARATE IMPACT

The Supreme Court has described disparate treatment as the most easily understood type of discrimination. This suggests that disparate impact
is not as easily understood. Nor is it as easily fixed. Controversial from
its origins, it has remained so, even after codification by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. It has been suggested recently that development of disparate impact may have been a mistake that stunted the development of a
more robust disparate treatment theory. 171 While it is interesting to ponder whether disparate impact should have been recognized and query
how effective it is today, my task is repairing the proof structure, not
abrogating the theory. First, even if we concluded that disparate impact
either has too many problems or is not sufficiently effective in practice to
justify repairs, one can only imagine the political firestorm that would be
generated by a proposal to legislatively abolish disparate impact. Although firestorms are sometimes needed, the damage wrought by this one
would be too great. Generally, it would be seen as retrenchment in U.S.
employment discrimination law, and that is too large a price to pay.
Moreover, it is worth noting that many other nations and international
organizations recognize the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
and "[t]he international marketplace of legal ideas provides a means of
'172
testing the value of a concept.
One more matter before moving to repairing the three parts of the
disparate impact proof structure: Should Congress provide that disparate
impact is not applicable in cases of reverse discrimination? It is tempting
to recommend this because the theory was explained by the Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. as knocking down artificial barriers intended
to keep out those against whom discrimination has been practiced historically.' 7 3 On balance, however, Congress should resist the temptation to
limit the applicability of disparate impact to traditional discrimination
cases. First, disparate impact is controversial enough as it is, raising concerns about affirmative action and quotas. One of the most divisive
things that can be done is to flaunt the fact that employment discrimination law is not always status blind or "color blind." Although that clearly
is true, it is an unpopular idea with some. 174 Thus, limiting disparate im171. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701 (2006).
172. Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Discrimination:
American Oddity or InternationallyAccepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.

108, 111 (1998). Although the disparate impact theory of discrimination is "an American
innovation," it has spread and been incorporated in the law of many other individual nations, directives of the European Union, and conventions of the International Labour Organization. See id. at 111-12.
173. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1506 ("[Tlhere
was at least something odd about using disparate impact to remove barriers to the employment of, say, whites.").
174. See Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1506 (describing "resistance to an unbalanced application of the theory [as] reflect[ing] the increasingly reflexive colorblindness in our law and
society, manifested by much of the present aversion to affirmative action").
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pact to traditional discrimination claims likely would harm the "moral
authority" of employment discrimination law in the view of the public.
Second, because it is so divisive, the restriction of disparate impact to
traditional discrimination claims is not politically feasible. Congress
should not do it because it is too controversial to pass, and merely raising
is
it could jeopardize other needed repairs discussed herein. Third, there175
unconstitutional.
be
would
restriction
a
such
that
least,
at
concern,
the
At a minimum, the limiting of disparate impact to traditional discrimination cases would be constitutionally challenged. Whether it withstood the
challenge, the public debate on this controversial and misunderstood issue would impugn employment discrimination law.
1.

Harmonizing Title VII and ADEA Differences

An initial matter to note here is to specify differences that may exist in
the Title VII and the ADEA versions of disparate impact, whether statutory or case law developed differences. There may be a difference in the
prima facie cases of the Title VII version and the ADEA version, and
there is a statutory distinction in the defenses.
If the prima facie cases are different, it is a difference developed in the
case law. When the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of disparate impact to age discrimination in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court
stated that, because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the
ADEA, it is the pre-1991 Wards Cove version of disparate impact that
applies under the ADEA.1 76 What that meant was not at all clear. The
Court revisited that statement in its decision in Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory, in which the Court explained the Smith statement as relating to "a plaintiff-employee's burden of identifying which
1 77
particular practices allegedly cause an observed disparate impact."'
Curiously, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to
overturn some parts of Wards Cove, 178 the Act seems to preserve the 1re79
quirement that a plaintiff identify a specific employment practice.
Thus, the meaning of the reference to the Wards Cove version of disparate impact in Smith v. City of Jackson was not effectively clarified in
Meacham. The Court also explained in Meacham that the statement
about Wards Cove may have referred to the fact that disparate impact
under the ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.18 0 As the Court
points out in Smith, however, ADEA disparate impact theory is rendered
175.
176.
177.
178.
defense
dicta.
179.

Id. passim.
544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (2008).
I say "parts" rather than holdings because the parts of Wards Cove regarding the
of business necessity and job relatedness overturned by the 1991 Act appear to be
"An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under

this subchapter only if-(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
...
42 U.S.C. § 2000eparticular employment practice that causes a disparate impact.
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).

180. Meacham, 128 S.Ct. at 2404.
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narrower by the Court's interpretation of the reasonable-factors-otherthan-age defense as being less onerous for defendants to satisfy than the
business necessity/job relatedness defense of Title VII.181 Ultimately, I
see no reason for Congress to differentiate between the prima facie case
for disparate impact under the ADEA and Title VII. If Congress agrees
with the Supreme Court's statements in Smith and Meacham that disparate impact is meant to be narrower under the ADEA than under Title
VII, that result can be maintained by leaving in place the Court's statements regarding the comparative stringency of the defenses.
The other difference between disparate impact under Title VII and the
ADEA is the defense. Under Title VII, it is business necessity/job relatedness, and under the ADEA it is reasonable factors other than age
(RFOA). This is established in the express language of the statutes. The
182
Supreme Court pointed out this difference in Smith v. City of Jackson
and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory183 in explaining that
plaintiffs will have more difficulty prevailing on disparate impact under
the ADEA than under Title VII. If Congress wishes to change this result,
it could amend the ADEA to replace the RFOA defense with the same
revamped business necessity defense that I describe below for Title VII.
However, if Congress agrees that it should be more difficult to win disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it should leave the RFOA defense
as is. My guess is that there would be political pressure to harmonize the
proof structures, both because there are powerful lobbying interests that
support legislation protecting older persons, and because the reason for
the distinction is not obvious. 184 Simplicity and "nondiscrimination"
favor a uniform proof structure. Thus, I recommend that Congress repeal
the RFOA defense and replace it with the new business necessity defense
that I recommend for Title VII. However, if Congress wishes to preserve
the greater difficulty of winning ADEA disparate impact claims (compared with Title VII claims), then it should retain the RFOA defense.
2. Fixing the Three Parts of the Prima Facie Case
The three parts of the prima facie case fit together as follows: 1) particular employment practice 2) causes 3) a disparate impact. The first and
last elements are problematic, but it seems to me that the last one is the
one Congress needs to repair. As to the first element, Congress could
change the requirement that the plaintiff identify a "particular" employment practice, but I think there are few good legislative solutions. What
constitutes a sufficiently specific practice has been challenging in Title
VII cases as well as in ADEA cases. For example, in EEOC v. Joe's
181. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
182. Id.
183. 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).
184. However, the Supreme Court has explained that age discrimination differs from
some other types of discrimination covered by Title VII. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231
(1983)).
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Stone Crab, Inc., a Title VII sex discrimination case, the majority and
dissent disagreed about whether the employer's hiring procedure constituted a particular employment practice. 18 5 In Smith v. City of Jackson, the
Supreme Court, while recognizing the applicability of disparate impact to
age discrimination, held that the city's pay plan designed to give larger
raises to less senior police did not have a "specific test, requirement, or
practice... that has an adverse impact on older workers."' 186 This uncertainty and caution regarding what constitutes a specific employment practice may be traceable to the Court's reluctant holding in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust that disparate impact applies to subjective practices
as well as objective practices and criteria, 8 7 and the holding in Wards
Cove that plaintiffs must link a particular practice with the impact it
causes and may not attack a bundle of practices.' 88
I do not recommend that Congress do anything to modify the requirement that plaintiffs identify a particular employment practice. Congress
could eliminate the requirement of identifying a particular practice and
even repeal the exception, thus permitting plaintiffs to target a bundle of
practices. However, Congress was not so inclined in 1991, even when
overturning most of Wards Cove, and I doubt it will be now.
The part of the prima facie case that most needs clarification is the
third part. In what group must disparate impact be established? The
question raised by Livingston v. Roadway Express1 89 needs to be answered. Is a plaintiff required to prove an impact manifested in the employer's workforce? Or is it sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that a
practice would produce a disparate impact in a group that could apply for
and hold the job at issue-a hypothetical labor pool from the general
population? 90 The answer should be the latter under the reading of
Connecticut v. Teal that I advocate, although Teal might be read more
narrowly. I think Congress should add language to the proof structure to
state that the practice must cause a disparate impact manifested in the
actual workforce or in an alternative relevant labor pool. Congress could
refer to Livingston and reject the holding of the case.
3.

Fixing the Defense of Business Necessity/Job Relatedness

It is not obvious that a major repair is needed here as courts have
worked fairly well with what they were given. However, Congress handled it so badly in the 1991 Act that the defense should be repaired.
Rather than explaining the meaning of job relatedness and business necessity, Congress included a section in the Act that referred to an inter185. 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
186. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241.

187. 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
188. This was codified in the 1991 Act, with an exception if the plaintiff proves that the
decision making process cannot be separated for analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
189. 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
190. See Perry, supra note 86, at 564-70.
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pretive memorandum for all standards referring to Wards Cove. That
memorandum provides that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."'191 With this statutory
language, some have even argued that the 1091 Act did not change the
Wards Cove version of the affirmative defense. 192 Congress can and
should provide more clarity than this.
The first problem with the business necessity/job relatedness defense is
easily fixed. The job-related requirement should be dropped. Business
necessity is the more rigorous standard, and usually it includes job relatedness. There may be some employment practices that satisfy business
necessity, but not job relatedness. For example, a court may conclude
that a nonfraternization or antinepotism policy is a business necessity,
although such a policy may not be job related in a strict sense. Still, Congress should simplify this standard by deleting job relatedness. Most of
the case law deals with the issue of business necessity, not job relatedness.
The second problem is the uncertainty of what business necessity
means-how to define it. At one end of the spectrum is a rigorous
(harder-to-satisfy) standard-a practice is a business necessity if it is or
determines "minimum qualifications that are necessary to perform the
job in question successfully. ' 193 At the other end is a less rigorous (more
easily satisfied) standard such as the one articulated in Wards Cove"serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer. 1 94 As judges and commentators have explained, there was no
settled definition for the business necessity standard before Wards
Cove. 195 A dissenting judge in Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority described the standard as variable, depending on the nature of the job, with employers benefiting from the more deferential
standard particularly in jobs involving safety issues. 196 Arguments can be
made for any of the definitions of business necessity as well as for leaving
the courts the flexibility to apply a sliding scale to different types of jobs.
Although this problem is not a catastrophic failure, Congress should repair what it mishandled in 1991. I recommend that Congress adopt the
stringent standard for business necessity. Although that standard may
191. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 ("No

statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional
Record S. 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied

upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act
that relates to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business
practice.").
192. See generally Michael Carvin, DisparateImpact Claims Underthe New Title VII, 68

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153 (1993).

193. Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 490 (3d Cir. 1999).
194. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
195. See, e.g., Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the
DisparateImpact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1484

(1996); Perry, supra note 86, at 581-85.
196. Lanning, 181 F.3d at 499-500 (Weiss, J., dissenting).
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not seem to give adequate deference to the judgment of employers in
some types of jobs, which the sliding scale can accommodate, the recommendation that I make below, regarding alternative employment practices, should soften the blow and ameliorate that concern.
4. Fixing Alternative Employment Practice
It is difficult to conceptualize how a court meaningfully and sensibly
can evaluate business necessity without taking into account the prospect
of alternative practices. Particularly under a stringent standard of business necessity, how can one determine that a practice is necessary unless
one considers possible alternative practices? For example, in Fitzpatrick
v. City of Atlanta, after deciding that the clean-shaven policy was a business necessity for firefighters, the Eleventh Circuit gave short shrift to the
plaintiff's argument that a shaving clinic, permitting shadow beards, was
an alternative employment practice. 197 The court explained that alternative employment practice necessarily was intertwined with business necessity: "As we have explained above in addressing the City's business
necessity defense, the firefighters have failed to create a genuine issue
that shadow beards are safe."' 198
Curiously, the unusual drafting of the provision codifying disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not even seem to create a threepart proof structure: it provides that a defendant is liable if a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case unless a defendant "demonstrate(s)" business necessity and job related or the plaintiff proves alternative employment practice.' 99 Congress should amend Title VII to provide that
alternative employment practices is not a separate step in the analysis but
is instead a factor to be taken into account in evaluating business necessity. This amendment would be a change in the existing law.
There is more that Congress might do with alternative employment
practice, but I do not recommend doing more. For example, it is understood that the alternative practice should be less discriminatory and still
accomplish the employer's objective. This raises two salient issues: 1)
How much less discriminatory must the alternative practice be?; and 2)
How effective must the alternative be in accomplishing the employer's
objective (i.e., must it be equally effective?)? Although these are important issues under alternative employment practice, I think they are difficult to address in legislation and should be left to courts to work out.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The proof structures of disparate treatment (pretext and mixed motives) and disparate impact form the engine of employment discrimination law. They are used to draft pleadings, to conduct discovery, to move
197. 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993).
198. Id. at 1122.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000).
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for summary judgment, to organize evidence for presentation at trial, to
move for judgment as a matter of law, and to craft jury instructions. Although these analyses are primarily about evidence and procedure, they
have become the focal point of discrimination law and have shaped how
we think about the substance of discrimination "because of" protected
characteristics. Over the life of employment discrimination law, the
proof structures have evolved and been modified by the Supreme Court,
the lower courts, and Congress. Congress last intervened to fix the proof
structures when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Since that time,
many issues have developed that have left the proof structures sputtering.
It is now so bad that judges do not know how to analyze motions for
summary judgment or properly instruct juries. It is time for Congress to
step in again and fix employment discrimination law. No repair could be
more important than a thorough checking and servicing of the proof
structures. With that repair, employment discrimination law will be good
for many more miles. While considering a number of changes to employment discrimination law, Congress should focus on job number one-fixing the engine.

